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CASE NOTES
PATENTS-COMPUTER PROGRAMS-A PROCESS IN
WHICH THE ONLY NOVEL FEATURE IS A MATHEMAT-
ICAL FORMULA IS NOT PATENTABLE SUBJECT MAT-
TER DESPITE POST-SOLUTION APPLICATIONS-Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a "Method For Up-
dating Alarm Limits."' An "alarm limit" is a numerical value,
which when reached, signals the presence of inefficient or dan-
gerous chemical process operating conditions such as tempera-
ture, pressure, or flow rates. Alarm limits for particular pro-
cesses normally remain fixed. However, during transient oper-
ating situations such as start-ups, alarm limits must be period-
ically updated to conform to changing operating capacities.
Flook sought to patent a method for updating alarm limits
on process variables involved in the catalytic conversion of
hydrocarbons. Such processes are common in the oil refining
and petrochemical industries. The updating method consisted
of three steps: an initial step measuring the present value of the
process variable (for example, the temperature); an intermedi-
ate step using an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm
value; and a final step adjusting the actual alarm limit to the
updated value. The mathematical algorithm of the intermedi-
ate step of the method is a procedure for solving a given type
of mathematical problem. It is this algorithm, used primarily.
for computerized calculations producing automatic adjust-
ments in alarm systems, that distinguished Flook's method
from conventional methods.'
The patent examiner rejected the application, finding that
the subject matter claimed was not eligible for patent protec-
tion. The Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office
sustained the rejection, reasoning that because mathematical
formulae constituted the only difference between Flook's
claims and the prior art in the public domain, a patent on his
method would in practical effect be a patent on the cluster of
mathematical formulae themselves. Such formulae are like
laws of nature and are hence unpatentable subject matter.3 The
1979 by Gail-Deanna Salasny.
1. Serial No. 194,032, filed October 29, 1971.
2. Id. at 13.
3. The final portion of the U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK 0-
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Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed,4 holding that
since solving the algorithm was but an intermediate step in the
entire procedure, and since Flook was claiming only the cataly-
tic conversion applications of the algorithm, the invention was
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a
six-three decision, holding that it was irrelevant that the algo-
rithm was part of a process, or that the inventor was claiming
only a limited use of the algorithm. The Court held that so long
as the algorithm is the only new thing in the invention, there
is no patentable subject matter. Laws of nature, including
mathematical formulae, are considered to have always been
known, to be part of the prior art, and to be in the public
domain and available to all inventors. However, the Court re-
fused to hold generally that computer programs are unpatent-
able, imploring Congress for a second time to decide the policy
questions surrounding patent protection for computer soft-
ware.6
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, assumed that
Flook's formula was novel and useful and that he discovered it.
He also assumed that the formula was the only novel feature
of the method since the Patent Office examiner's finding to
ICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (3d ed., rev. 55, July, 1977)
recites: "A scientific principle, divorced from any tangible structure, can be rejected
as not within the statutory classes. O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 Howard 62." The beginnning
portion of that same section states: "Patents are not granted for all new and useful
inventions and discoveries. The subject matter of the invention or discovery must come
within the boundaries set forth by 35 U.S.C. 101 .. " 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) pro-
vides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor. .. ."
4. Application of Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977). Appeal is authorized by 35
U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
5. The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
6. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) ("[If] these programs are to be
patentable ...considered action by Congress is needed."). In Gottschalk, the first
U.S. Supreme Court case in the area (Flook being the third), applicant claimed a
method of programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert signals from
binary-coded decimal form into pure binary form as a patentable process. It was held
not to be a process within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, and thus not patentable
subject matter.
Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), was the second U.S. Supreme Court case
in this area and involved a general purpose computer, programmed to provide bank
customers with an individualized and categorized breakdown of their transactions: the
invention being sold as a computer program and being claimed patentable as a ma-
chine within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court held that it was unpatentable
as being obvious to one skilled in the art (a 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection) and did not reach
the issue of general computer program patentability.
PARKER v. FLOOK
that effect went unchallanged by Flook. Justice Stevens stated:
"The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm,
must be new and useful. Indeed, the novelty of the mathemati-
cal algorithm is not a determining factor at all."7
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. R.C.A.' and Funk
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.' were cited as pointing
to the proper analysis for this case because the case turned on
the proper construction of section 101 of the Patent Act, which
describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protec-
tion.1° Flook's process was unpatentable because once the algo-
rithm was assumed to be within the prior art, the application
considered as a whole contained no patentable invention.
The hopes that certain computer software would be pat-
entable, raised when the lower court distinguished the Flook
facts from Application of Christensen," were dashed. In
Christensen, although an algorithm as part of a method was
held unpatentable, the holding was limited to processes where
there was no post-solution application of the algorithm. The
lower court also distinguished the Flook situation from
Gottschalk v. Benson,'" where a process for converting binary
coded decimal numerals to pure binary numerals was held un-
patentable. Unlike Flook, however, Gottschalk involved a pat-
ent that would have preempted the mathematical formula en-
tirely; use of the algorithm in any manner would have consti-
tuted an infringement.
Until legislative action defines the policy concerning the
nature of programs that may be appropriate for patent protec-
tion and the form and duration of such protection, the doctrine
seems to be one of entrainment. At the present time, adding
an algorithmic step to a process apparently will not destroy the
patentability of that process, so long as the algorithmic step is
surrounded by a process that, when examined alone, is protect-
able by a patent.
7. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
8. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, 306 U.S. 86,
94 (1939): "While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patent-
able invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of
scientific truth may be."
9. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948):
He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim
to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention
from such discovery, it must come from the application of the law of
nature to a new and useful end.
10. The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
11. 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
12. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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The Court's decision may have been influenced by the
magnitude of the practical problems involved should computer
software be deemed directly patentable. The Patent Office
does not yet have a classification system or search files for
computer software. Patent Office examiners are already strain-
ing under the volume of patent applications and the ever-
increasing complexity of subject matter in many patent appli-
cations. Few examiners have software expertise, making staff-
ing an additional strain. They would be unable to handle the
thousands of additional applications. The wand has been
passed to Congress, but Congress seems unwilling to act. Per-
haps Congress has been swayed by the Patent Commissioner's
argument that program patents would have a debilitating ef-
fect on the software industry. Alternately, Congress may feel
that the copyright laws afford adequate and less expensive pro-
tection.
Gail-Deanna Salasny
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CIVIL RIGHTS-PREVAILING DEFENDANT IN A TITLE
VII CASE MAY BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES UPON
A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM WAS FRIVO-
LOUS, UNREASONABLE, OR GROUNDLESS-Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
Rosa C. Helm, a black employee at Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co., Inc. (hereafter Christiansburg), who was laid off for
a one-month period, filed a racial discrimination charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (hereafter Act).' After
two years of conciliation efforts with Christiansburg, the EEOC
notified her that its attempts had been unsuccessful and ad-
vised her of her right to sue the company. Mrs. Helm, however,
failed to pursue this remedy within the thirty-day statutory
period.2
The Act was amended in 1972 to authorize the EEOC to
bring suit in its own name on behalf of a victim of employment
discrimination.3 The EEOC, concluding that the Helm case
was pending before it when the amendment went into effect,
brought suit on the charges in federal district court.' The dis-
trict court granted defendant Christiansburg's motion for a
summary judgment, holding that the charge had not been
pending on the effective date of the amendment, but rather
that when Helm had been given her right-to-sue letter, the
EEOC's authority over the case had terminated.5 Additionally,
the district court found the EEOC's claim not "frivolous" be-
cause it was an issue of first impression and involved a reasona-
ble, though erroneous, interpretation of the new amendment.
The defendant's petition for an allowance of attorneys fees
under section 706(k) of the Act was denied, and it appealed,
contending that attorneys fees should be awarded to all defen-
1979 by Eileen Kato Player.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),
provides: "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person."
2. Id. § 14, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), requires that a charge must be brought "by
or on behalf of the person aggrieved. . . within thirty days after receiving notice that
the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law."
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (codified at scattered sections of 5, 42 U.S.C.).
4. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 414 n.3 (1978).
5. Id. at 414.
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dants who prevail in a Title VII action.'
The Supreme Court initially reviewed prior cases dealing
with the award of attorneys fees in similar situations. Under
the general "American rule," as set forth in Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Society,7 attorneys fees may not ordinarily be
recovered by a prevailing party as part of its costs." However,
limited exceptions to this rule have been developed. In
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, I the Court, in interpreting
a similar statute under Title II of the Civil Rights Act, author-
ized the award of attorneys fees to successful plaintiffs in a
Title II action "unless special circumstances would render such
a recovery unjust."' 0 The decision was based on the congres-
sional intent to encourage individuals injured by racial dis-
crimination to seek judicial relief." In Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,'" the Newman standard for the awarding of attorneys
fees was applied to prevailing plaintiffs in a Title VII action.'
Again, the Court emphasized congressional objectives and
strong public interest in encouraging eradication of discrmini-
natory employment practice."
In the present case, defendant Christiansburg contended
that the standard enunciated in Newman for prevailing plain-
tiffs should also apply to prevailing defendants in a Title VII
action. 5 The EEOC argued, on the other hand, that a defen-
dant should not be awarded attorneys fees unless it showed
that the plaintiff's action was brought in bad faith. The Court
rejected both arguments.'"
With respect to defendant's contentions, the Court em-
phasized two strong policy considerations behind awarding at-
torneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action that
do not apply to the situation where a defendant prevails. First,
the legislative history of section 706(k) indicates that the allow-
6. Id. at 413-14. See note 1 supra, for wording of § 706(k).
7. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
8. Id. at 247.
9. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
10. Id. at 402. Title II of the Civil Rights Act, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)
provides: "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorneys fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person."
11. Id.
12. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
13. Id. at 415.
14. Id.
15. 434 U.S. at 417-18.
16. Id. at 418.
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ance for attorneys fees was included to make it easier for a
plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit. 7 Second,
by awarding a successful plaintiff attorneys fees, it is the viola-
tor of federal law who pays the price. 8
Turning to the EEOC's contention, the Court expressed
doubt that Congress had enacted section 706(k) with the intent
that attorneys fees be awarded to a prevailing defendant only
upon a showing of plaintiff's bad faith."9 The Court felt it would
not be fair to provide an incentive for plaintiffs to sue, and at
the same time foreclose the possibility of the defendant re-
covering expenses for defending a groundless action unless
(s)he could show bad faith. The Court referred to statements
by several Senators in floor discussions of Title II that indi-
cated their belief that awarding counsel fees to prevailing de-
fendants would serve "to deter the bringing of lawsuits without
foundation, '"" "to discourage frivolous suits,"'" and "to dimin-
ish the likelihood of unjustified suits being brought.""
The Court found that Congress had a dual intent in enact-
ing section 706(k): 1) to encourage persons injured by employ-
ment discrimination to bring suit under Title VII, and 2) at the
same time to provide defendants the opportunity to recover
expenses resulting from "burdensome litigation having no legal
or factual basis. ' 23
The Court adopted the standard first announced in United
States Steel Corporation v. United States" to determine when
attorneys fees should be allowed a prevailing Title VII defen-
dant. The U.S. Steel court held that attorneys fees should be
awarded to defendants "upon a finding that the plaintiffs ac-
tion was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith." 2 In applying that
standard to the facts of Christiansburg Garment, the Court
found plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or without merit and,
therefore, affirmed the district court's denial of fees. 26
17. Id. at 420.
18. Id. at 418.
19. No statutory provision would have been necessary, for under American com-
mon law, attorneys fees may be assessed against a party who has proceeded in bad
faith. Id. at 419.
20. 110 CONo. REc. 13668 (1964) (remarks of Senator Lausche).
21. Id. at 14214 (remarks of Senator Pastore).
22. Id. at 6534 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
23. 434 U.S. at 420. See also Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
24. 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1975).
25. 434 U.S. at 421. A similar standard was announced in Carrion v. Yeshiva
University, 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976).
26. 434 U.S. at 423-24.
19791 489
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This approach appears to strike a balance between two
seemingly conflicting policies-encouraging Title VII suits and
discouraging frivolous suits. Clearly both Congress and the
Court are more concerned with eliminating employment dis-
crimination, but the decision recognizes that fairness cuts both
ways.
Eileen Kato Player
EVIDENCE-REMOTE SENSING OUTPUT OF FOR-
WARD LOOKING INFRARED SCANNER (FLIR) IS IN-
ADMISSABLE FOR UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION OF
OBJECTS-United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.
1978).
At about 1:45 a.m. on March 25, 1976, a customs patrol
officer observed an unidentified blip on his screen at the radar
control center in Phoenix, Arizona. The aircraft, in Mexican
airspace and heading toward the United States border, did not
emit the customary electronic identification signal. A customs
plane was directed into the area. Using a forward looking in-
frared scanner (FLIR), a new system capable of detecting and
tracking remote objects by sensing their infrared radiation,' the
customs plane was able to observe and follow what appeared
to be a DC-3 type aircraft. The plane was followed until it
landed on a dry lake bed in San Bernardino County, California.The customs plane continued its surveillance while cir-
cling at 5500 feet. The FLIR operator, Customs Officer James
Gibbs, observed a peculiar pattern of "spots" around the eleva-
tor and left wingtip of the DC-3. Three trucks were observed
approaching the aircraft and staying near it for nearly two
hours. When the trucks departed, the customs plane followed
them until they were intercepted by police who found 4700
pounds of marijuana in the trucks. By 4:30 a.m., when the
customs plane returned to the lake bed, the DC-3 had de-
parted. At about 6:00 a.m., a DC-3 piloted by Christopher
Russel Kilgus landed at Las Vegas International Airport. At
8:00 a.m., the customs aircraft flew over the airport using the
FLIR in an attempt to make a unique identification of the DC-
3 observed on the dry lake bed.' Based on his observation of
, 1979 by Tom May.
1. FLIR is only one of a wide variety of remote sensing technologies. They have
in common the collection of information about distant objects through the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. FLIR was originally developed for use aboard military com-
bat aircraft to detect and track targets. FLIR operates by sensing nonvisible thermal
infrared radiation emitted by the target object. The information received is electroni-
cally processed to enable display on a screen similar to a black-and-white TV. Al-
though the range and resolution (sensitivity) of the FLIR remain military secrets, it is
claimed to be capable of generic identification. That is, the image created might
clearly be recognized as a DC-3 as opposed to other aircraft types. This seems consis-
tent with its military objective.
For further information on infrared and other remote sensing technologies, see F.
SABINs, JR., REMOTE SENSING PRINCIPLES AND INTERPRETATION (1978). See also Latin,
Tannehill & White, Remote Sensing Evidence and Environmental Law, 64 CAuIF. L.
REv. 1300 (1976).
2. Unique identification refers to the ability to distinguish an individual object
491
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"spots" around the elevator and wingtip of the DC-3 in Las
Vegas, Officer Gibbs concluded that the Kilgus aircraft was the
same DC-3 observed at the dry lake. Kilgus and his passengers
were arrested and charged with illegal importation of mari-
juana and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.3 A
search of the Kilgus aircraft failed to recover any marijuana
debris.
The case was heard in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California. The defense moved to ex-
clude the testimony of Officer Gibbs on the basis that FLIR
had not gained acceptance within the relevant scientific com-
munity for the purpose of unique identification of objects and
was therefore inadmissible as scientific evidence under the ra-
tionale of Frye v. United States.4 After a hearing, the court
denied the motion. The case was submitted to the court on the
hearing transcript, which included Officer Gibbs' testimony,
and a joint stipulation of facts.5 Kilgus and his passengers were
each found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison.'
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the de-
fendants renewed their arguments as to the admissibility of
Officer Gibbs' testimony. The court of appeals reversed the
convictions, concluding that Gibbs' testimony was both inad-
missible and the only substantial evidence linking the defen-
among others of its type based on characteristics unique to that object. This would
require greater sensitivity than a merely generic identification. In the present case, the
Kilgus aircraft was only one of several DC-3's at the airport. This and additional facts
presented in the text that do not appear in the reported decision can be found in,
Opening Brief for Appellant at 24, 31, United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.
1978) (citing expert testimony and the joint stipulation of facts submitted to the trial
court).
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 952, 960, 963 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Appellants
were also charged with, but not convicted of, conspiracy to commit these offenses.
4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye established, without citation to any author-
ity, the rule that has become the touchstone for admissiblity of scientific evidence. It
states that the principle upon which scientific evidence is based "must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs." Id. at 1014. Failure to clear this hurdle excludes the evidence from any consid-
eration. While often criticized by commentators, it remains the rule in a great majority
of jurisdictions. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCR § 203 (2d ed.
1972); J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 6.3, 6.14-
.16, 6.18 (2d ed. 1971); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibilitfof Scientific
Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 10-15; Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence
in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. Rav. 313, 323-36 (1963). California adheres to the major-
ity view. See People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950); People v.
Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
5. Opening Brief for Appellant at 1-2, United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th
Cir. 1978).
6. Id. at 1.
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dants to the crime.
In resolving the admissibility question, the court noted
four "serious problems" with Gibbs' testimony.8 First, Gibbs
could not qualify as an expert on FLIR technology and had no
training or experience in its use for unique identification. Sec-
ond, uncontrolled environmental variables that influence FLIR
performance had not been accounted for. The defense was able
to show that temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, and
wind conditions, all of which affect FLIR images, had been
markedly different in Las Vegas at 8:00 a.m. than at the lake
bed at 4:30 a.m. Third, the defense had been denied access, for
reasons of military secrecy, to information necessary to evalu-
ate FLIR capabilities and thus could not adequately impeach
opposition testimony. Finally, citing Frye,I the court observed
that testimony of experts had established that "FLIR is not a
generally accepted technique among the scientific community
for the unique identification of remote objects."' 0
As a result, it seems clear that FLIR, at least at its present
level of technology, will remain inadmissible for unique identi-
fication of objects. Even if qualified experts operated the
equipment, environmental variables were accounted for, and
technical information about the system were released, there
would remain the lack of acceptance in the scientific com-
munity for unique identification. The court seems unwilling to
allow the evidentiary use of FLIR to grow beyond its own design
limits.
The court specifically held open the possibility that FLIR
might be admitted for generic identification, "[aissuming a
proper foundation as to reliability of generic identification and
of the expertise of the operator" is established." As an exam-
ple, the court suggested that a continuous FLIR surveillance
from an aerial intercept to a ground intercept might be used
to establish the fact that a state or international border had
been crossed.2
As a result of this dicta regarding the acceptable use of
customs surveillance equipment, issues of FLIR admissibility
7. 571 F.2d at 509. Officer Gibbs was the only available witness as to the FLIR
images because no permanent record was made of the electronic signals or the pro-
jected images. Opening Brief for Appellant at 14, United States v.'Kilgus, 571 F.2d
508 (9th Cir. 1978).
8. 571 F.2d at 510.
9. Id.
10. Id. (emphasis in original).
11. Id. at 510 n.2.
12. Id.
1979]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
in future cases will probably focus on its use for generic identifi-
cation. While the "serious problems" in Kilgus will become the
primary issues in such cases, they will, with one exception, be
much easier to overcome where only generic identification is
attempted. The lack of expertise could be overcome by training
operators so they would qualify as expert witnesses, or by re-
cording FLIR output to allow later analysis by established ex-
perts in the field. In addition, the level of expertise required to
make generic identification may be less than that required for
unique identification.
The second problem of uncontrolled environmental varia-
bles would seem irrelevant where surveillance is continuous,
and only generic identification is attempted. This problem
might also be resolved by later analysis and adjustment of
recorded output. FLIR's acceptance in the scientific com-
munity for the purpose of generic identification has already
been established and is assumed by the court in Kilgus. 13 Ex-
pert testimony submitted at the hearing on the motion to ex-
clude Gibbs' testimony confirmed that scientific acceptance of
FLIR was limited to its use for generic identification.
The only remaining "problem" may be the continued una-
vailability to the defense of technical information as to FLIR
capabilities due to military secrecy. Failure to overcome this
last barrier may prevent use of FLIR for generic identification.
It is not clear whether acceptance by the relevant scientific
community combined with sufficient operator expertise and
control of environmental variables will, without this last ele-
ment, assure the court of FLIR's reliability even for generic
identification purposes. While the letter of the Frye test may
be satisfied in such a case, one of its intended purposes-to
provide the defense an effective opportunity to rebut prosecu-
tion evidence'-would be frustrated by continued secrecy. For
generic identification, the defense might want to know at what
range FLIR becomes unreliable, what atmospheric conditions
might interrupt an otherwise continuous image, or for that
matter, what the military definition of "reliable" is. National
security interests may prevent witness response to such ques-
tions.15 Such a situation may present a court with the problem
13. "There is no question that the FLIR can be used for generic identification of
objects. . . ." Id. at 509 (emphasis in original).
14. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (cited by the court
in Kilgus), analyzes this and other policy factors supporting the Frye doctrine.
15. Expert witnesses in Kilgus declined to answer similar questions on this
[Vol. 19
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of the admissibility of evidence based on scientifically ac-
cepted techniques where the basis of that acceptance is not
open to judicial inquiry.
Tom May
ground. Opening Brief for Appellant at 23, United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th
Cir. 1978).

EQUITABLE INDEMNITY-LIABILITY APPORTIONED
BETWEEN A STRICTLY LIABLE DEFENDANT AND A
NEGLIGENT DEFENDANT ON A COMPARATIVE FAULT
BASIS-Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579
P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
In January, 1978, plaintiff Rita Elliot was injured in a
supermarket when the shopping cart she was using collapsed.
Plaintiff brought suit against Safeway Stores and Nest-Kart,
the manufacturer of the cart, arguing that the defendants were
liable under theories of both negligence and strict liability. The
defendants in turn raised a comparative negligence defense.
The trial court, following the suggestion of the California
Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab,' directed special interroga-
tories to the jury regarding under what theory, if any, each
defendant was liable, and what proportion of the fault, if any,
was attributable to each defendant. The jury found Safeway
eighty percent at fault under both negligence and strict liabil-
ity, and Nest-Kart twenty percent at fault under strict liabil-
ity. The jury absolved the plaintiff of any comparative negli-
gence. The court entered a total judgment of $25,000 against
the defendants. The judgment was paid by Safeway and Nest-
Kart on the eighty percent/twenty percent basis.
Safeway moved for a judgment of contribution, requiring
Nest-Kart to pay an additional thirty percent, to achieve an
equal apportionment between the two tortfeasors. The trial
court granted the motion, noting that although common sense
suggested an eighty/twenty split, California's contribution
statutes required an equal division of liability among joint tort-
feasors.1 The Court of Appeal for the Third District affirmed.3
e 1979 by L. Ronald Jorgensen.
1. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240,119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 872 (1975) (suggesting that such interrogatories would be invaluable in assuring
proper jury consideration).
2. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 875 (West Supp. 1978) provides in part:
(a) Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two
or more defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of contribution
among them as hereinafter provided.
(b) Such right of contribution shall be administered in accordance
with the principles of equity.
(c) Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tort-
feasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more
than his pro rata share thereof ...
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876 (West Supp. 1978) provides in part: "(a) The pro rata
share of each tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be determined by dividing the entire
judgment equally among all of them."
3. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 134 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1977), vacated, 21 Cal.
3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
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The. California Supreme Court reversed, reapportioning the
judgment on an eighty percent/twenty percent basis, using the
doctrine of equitable indemnity it had recently developed in
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court.4
In American Motorcycle, the California Supreme Court
had examined the contribution statutes to determine if they
needed to be followed slavishly when comparative fault had
been established among multiple tortfeasors. While the com-
mon law indemnity doctrine required a more culpable tortfea-
sor, the California Legislature chose a contribution model
under which the tortfeasors divided the liability equally. The
development of jury interrogatories that more concisely de-
termined the comparative fault of a plaintiff and various defen-
dants suggested the application of a more equitable division of
liability among defendants-a modified equitable indemnity
doctrine.5 The American Motorcycle court concluded that the
contribution statutes were not intended to bar the development
of that doctrine and apportioned liability among multiple
negligent defendants.
In Safeway, the supreme court expanded the equitable
indemnity doctrine, using it to apportion liability between a
negligent defendant and a strictly liable defendant. The court
dismissed the argument that it is illogical to compare the rela-
tive fault of negligence with the relative "no fault" of strict
liability, noting that "the suggested differences are more theo-
retical than practical, "I and pointing out that California courts
have extracted judgments from mixed groups of negligent and
strictly liable defendants since Greenman v. Yuba Power Co.7
The court additionally observed that the jury below was able
to find comparative fault between the defendants and to appor-
tion the responsibility.
Public policy was an important basis of the court's deci-
sion. It pointed out that "fairness and other tort policies, such
as deterrence of dangerous conduct or encouragement of
accident-reducing behavior, frequently called for apportion-
ment of liability of joint tort-feasors."I An inconsistent judg-
4. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
5. It should be noted that the indemnity doctrine only concerns itself with the
liability of defendants to each other. The joint tortfeasors are still held jointly and
severally liable for damages as against the plaintiff. See id.
6. 21 Cal. 3d at 331, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
7. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1973) (seminal case announcing
California's policy on strict liability).
8. 21 Cal. 3d at 330, 579 P.2d at 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
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ment would result where, as in this case, a negligent manufac-
turer could pay less than the less culpable but strictly liable
manufacturer. The court concluded that "'common sense' and
equitable considerations suggest that Safeway should bear a
proportionately greater share of liability for the accident than
Nest-Kart."'
Although the comparative indemnity question had been
properly preserved at trial, the lower court's ruling occurred
before American Motorcycle. The supreme court applied
American Motorcycle retroactively, noting that the Li court, in
adopting comparative negligence, had raised questions as to
the future standing of the contribution statutes.'" The court
concluded that, since the opinion in Li had advised trial courts
to use broad discretion in making use of jury interrogatories in
comparative negligence cases involving multiple defendants,
these defendants had been on notice that apportionment of
liability could be based on such interrogatories. Therefore, the
court held that where interrogatories are used and the indem-
nity question preserved, the benefits of American Motorcycle
will be available to all defendants diligently pursuing the
issue."
Safeway is the latest in a series of cases determining the
effect of the adoption of comparative negligence in Li. The
decision in Safeway reaffirms the commitment in Ameican
Motorcycle to the doctrine of equitable indemnity. The equita-
ble indemnity doctrine, not the contribution statutes, will be
used when special jury verdicts establish comparative fault
regardless of the tort theory used to establish liability. This
decision encourages the use of interrogatories and suggests that
a defendant may utilize them to apportion fault among all
defendants-perhaps even when comparative negligence has
not been raised as a defense. Defendants and trial courts are
on notice to be resourceful in applying the doctrine of equitable
indemnity.
L. Ronald Jorgensen
9. Id.
10. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
11. 21 Cal. 3d at 333-34, 579 P.2d at 447, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSIONS MUST BE FOUND
VOLUNTARY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT-People
v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1978).
On January 11, 1976, defendant Robert Jimenez and an
accomplice entered El Norteno Bar in El Monte, California. In
the process of committing armed robbery, defendant's compan-
ion shot and killed a customer attempting to exit through the
back door.'
Police obtained fingerprints of the defendants from a beer
bottle at the scene of the crime. A waitress positively identified
defendant from mug shots shown to her by police shortly after
the robbery. Twelve days later, defendant and his companion
were arrested at the latter's residence.'
Following his arrest, defendant was interrogated for sev-
eral hours by two police officers. The officers allegedly fright-
ened defendant with talk of the death penalty and speculated
that things might go easier for him if he talked. Defendant then
gave an oral confession in which he admitted participating in
the robbery. He confessed to driving the getaway car and shar-
ing in the stolen money, but stated that his codefendant had
actually shot the customer. Several hours later, defendant
tape-recorded a statement of essentially the same content.
During the trial, defendant moved to suppress these con-
fessions on the ground that they were involuntary since they
were induced by promises of leniency. The trial court, after a
hearing on the motion, found the recorded statement voluntary
but failed to declare what standard of proof it was applying.
The recorded statement was played to the jury at defendant's
trial, and he was convicted of first degree murder, armed rob-
bery, and assault with a deadly weapon. 3
The California Supreme Court reversed, voting six to one,
holding that: 1) the prosecution must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the confession was voluntarily obtained;
and 2) defendant's confessions resulted from a promise of le-
niency and therefore were involuntary as a matter of law.4
Prior to Jimenez, California courts agreed that the burden
of proof on the issue of voluntariness of confessions rested with
, 1979 by Michael K. Stevens.
1. People v. Jiminez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 600, 500 P.2d 672, 674, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172,
174 (1978).
2. Id. at 601, 580 P.2d at 674, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
3. Id. at 600, 580 P.2d at 674, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
4. Id. at 609, 612-13, 580 P.2d at 679, 682-83, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 179, 182-83.
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the prosecution. There was disagreement, however, as to
whether the law required proof beyond a reasonable doubt or
merely proof by a preponderance of the evidence.5 Those courts
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt were interpreting
the United States Supreme Court's requirement of "a fair and
reliable determination of the issue of voluntariness" as a strict
standard.
The United States Supreme Court confronted the issue
directly in Lego v. Twomey,I holding that the Constitution only
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.8 The Court
noted, however, that "the states are free, pursuant to their own
law, to adopt a higher standard."' Most California courts sub-
sequently adopted the lower standard.'"
In establishing the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the majority of the California Supreme Court in
Jimenez first examined the consequences resulting from an er-
roneous admission of a confession. Stating that "the standard
of proof may . . . vary, depending upon the gravity of the
consequences that would result from an erroneous determina-
tion of the issue involved,"" the majority noted that a jury is
not permitted to reconsider the issue once a trial judge admits
a confession as voluntary. Appellate courts usually rubber
stamp that determination unless it is entirely unworthy of be-
lief. This being the case, the court stated that "the conse-
quences resulting from an erroneous determination of the vol-
untariness issue are especially severe, because the trial court's
decision is almost always determinative of this issue.'"'12
The court noted several policy considerations that form
the basis for the privilege against self-incrimination and justify
requiring a strict standard of proof. According to the court,
those policies are
5. Compare People v. Jackson, 19 Cal. App. 3d 95,96 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1971) (proof
beyond a reasonable doubt required); People v. Daniels, 1 Cal. App. 3d 367, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 675 (1969) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required); People v. Stroud, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 670, 78 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1969) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required) with
People v. Barrow, 60 Cal. App. 3d 984, 131 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976) (proof by preponder-
ance of evidence required); People v. Chen, 37 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 112 Cal. Rptr. 894
(1974) (proof by preponderance of evidence required).
6. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964).
7. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
8. Id. at 486-88.
9. Id. at 489.
10. See, e.g., People v. Barron, 60 Cal. App. 3d 984, 131 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1974);
People v. Chen, 37 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 112 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1974); People v. Moreno, 61
Cal. App. 3d 688, 132 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1976).
11. 21 Cal. 3d at 604, 580 P.2d at 677, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
12. Id. at 607, 580 P.2d at 678, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
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... unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilema of self-accusation, perjury or contempt
. . . fear that self-incriminatory statements will be
elicited by inhuman treatment and abuses. respect for
the inviolability of the human personality . . . and . . .
realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to
the guilty' is often a 'protection of the innocent.' "'i
Additionally, the majority found that the application of
this stricter standard would possibly have a positive effect on
the fact-finding process in that the higher standard would re-
duce the number of coerced confessions in general, thereby
reducing the number of coerced false confessions." Finally, the
court noted that by its establishment of the appropriate stan-
dard of proof in California for determining the voluntariness of
a confession: "Any uncertainty that may have existed in the
years after Lego. . .will now be eliminated and continuity will
be restored to the law on this issue."'
15
The majority stated that the result was required as "a
judicially declared rule of criminal procedure,"'" and declined
to decide the question on the basis of the California Constitu-
tion. Therefore, the path remains open for the state legislature
to reinstate the lower standard of proof.
Justice Clark argued in dissent that since the majority
found the confessions involuntary as a matter of law, their
"judicially declared rule of criminal procedure" is mere dicta. 7
Relying on Lego, Clark concluded thiat proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence is all that is necessary since it is very
doubtful that the reasonable doubt standard will prevent
enough lawless police conduct to outweigh the public interest
in arriving at the truth."8
People v. Jimenez emphatically established the standard
for determining the issue of voluntariness of a confession in
California. It also focused on the high value courts place on
constitutional rights and their protection. Certainly, it has in-
creased the burden of proof of the voluntariness issue, but the
increase is justified considering the serious nature of confes-
sions and the manner in which they may sometimes be ob-
13. Id. at 605, 580 P.2d at 677, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (quoting Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1954)).
14. Id. at 607, 580 P.2d at 678, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
15. Id. at 608, 580 P.2d at 679, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
16. Id. at 605, 580 P.2d at 677, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
17. Id. at 614, 580 P.2d at 683, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
18. Id. at 614-15, 580 P.2d at 683-84, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84.
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tained. Whether this new standard will inhibit the ultimate
goal of arriving at the truth is a difficult question. A higher
standard may result in a "more accurate truth" even though
it makes that truth more difficult to prove.
Michael K. Stevens
FAMILY LAW: ADOPTION-PRESUMED FATHER: MINI-
MUM CONTACT WITH CHILD REQUIRED TO SUPPORT
PRESUMPTION UNDER CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SEC-
TION 7004(a)(4)-Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624,
145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978).
Two men, Scott R. and Charles K., claimed to be the
father of infant Marie R. Less than a month before Marie's
birth, Charles filed a complaint to establish paternity. Sheila
R., Marie's mother, had been engaged to Charles, but decided
to marry Scott three days before Marie's birth. The birth certif-
icate named Scott as the father. Blood tests performed to de-
termine paterrity were inconclusive. Charles had offered to-
contribute to prenatal, birth, and after-birth expenses. Sheila
had refused to accept any support from Charles. She also pre-
vented him from ever actually seeing the baby.
Immediately after Marie's birth, Sheila and Scott placed
the baby with petitioners Jill and Ronald K. for adoption. Peti-
tioners began adoption proceedings in the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Since Charles' paternity action was still
pending, they provided him with notice of the proceedings pur-
suant to California Civil Code section 7017.'
Charles contended that he became a "presumed" father
under California Civil Code section 7004(a)(4), which provides,
in part, that a man is presumed to be the natural father of a
child if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds
out the child as his own natural child."2 The trial court held
that although the mother prevented actual receipt of the baby
by Charles, his active attempt to have the child with him con-
stituted constructive reception.' He was, therefore, the pre-
sumed father of Marie, and his consent was required4 before the
adoption could proceed.5 Petitioners Scott and Sheila appealed
this order.
The issue before the court on appeal was whether Charles
1979 by Merril L. Zebe.
1. CAL. CiV. CODE § 7017(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978) provides in relevant part: "If
a mother relinquishes or consents to or proposes to relinquish for adoption a child who
has (1) a presumed father under subdivision (a) of Section 7004 . the father shall
be given notice of the adoption proceeding .. "
3. Matter of Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 626, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122,
124 (1978).
4. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1978) provides in part: "A child having a
presumed father under subdivision (a) of section 7004 cannot be adopted without the
consent of its parents if living. . ....
5. 79 Cal. App. 3d at 627, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
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had qualified as a "presumed" father under Civil Code section
7004(a)(4). The appellate court concluded that, absent a show-
ing of minimal contact with the child, there could be no re-
ceipt, constructive or otherwise, by a purported father to raise
the presumption
In support of his claim to being a presumed father, Charles
relied upon a series of cases decided under former Civil Code
section 230, which provided that if the father of an illegitimate
child publicly acknowledged it as his own, received it into his
family, and otherwise treated it as if it were a legitimate child,
he thereby adopted it as such.' The court found that the cases
decided under former section 230 had some value in interpret-
ing section 7004(a)(4) of the Uniform Parentage Act, as
adopted in California, due to the similarity in language be-
tween the two sections.' The court concluded, however, that
those cases were not controlling in the case at bench since
section 230, by its terms, presupposed the fact of paternity and
dealt with the concept of legitimacy, whereas the thrust of the
new legislation was to promote the establishment of a parent-
child relationship."°
In addressing Charles' main argument that he had openly
recognized Marie as his own and had thereby constructively
received her into his home, the court found that even in those
cases decided under former section 230, where the courts were
straining to find legitimation, there was some actual contact
between the natural father and child." The court thus held
that there must be minimal contact for there to be receipt to
establish the presumption under section 7004(a)(4).11
The court's holding narrows the interpretation of "receipt"
by requiring that a purported father show some minimal con-
tact with the child before a presumption of paternity can be
drawn in accordance with Civil Code section 7004(a)(4). It
6. Id. at 628, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
7. Id. at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
8. CAL. Civ. CODE § 230 (West 1954) (repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 1244, § 8).
9. 79 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
10. Id.
11. See Lavell v. Adoption Inst., 185 Cal. App. 2d 577, 8 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1960)
(an admitted natural father had lived with the mother at conception and had openly
acknowledged that the expected child was his); Hurst v. Hurst, 277 Cal. App. 2d 859,
39 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1964) (an admitted natural father rented an apartment in his name
for the mother and child and paid the expenses of the household); In re Richard M.,
14 Cal. 3d 783, 537 P.2d 363, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1975) (the natural father and mother
had lived together for two weeks after the birth of the child, and thereafter, the child,
with the consent of the mother, visited the father).
12. 79 Cal. 3d at 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
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clearly establishes that reasonable efforts to receive the child
are not sufficient to support the presumption. It leaves unan-
swered the question whether actual physical reception into the
purported father's home is required. The decision, therefore,
does not exclude the possibility of other courts finding contact
sufficient to constitute constructive reception. Since this court
did not define the degree of minimal contact necessary to
establish paternity rights, such interpretative problems will
persist under the Uniform Parentage Act until there are more
specific guidelines established.
The Marie decision reflects the present policy of the Uni-
form Parentage Act to promote the establishment of a parent-
child relationship rather than technical legitimation. The deci-
sion is favorable to the adoptive parents and their already es-
tablished relationship with the child. The court properly fo-
cuses on who should care for the child rather than struggle with
a tenuous claim to paternity.
Merril L. Zebe
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